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Policing in the United States is characterized by an ongoing dialogue with the public 
regarding what it means to wield legitimate or rightful authority (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; 
Tyler, 1990). The police make various claims to legitimacy, to which their audience—the 
public—interprets and reacts favorably or unfavorably, conveying or withholding audience 
legitimacy. A critical element of this process is perceived audience legitimacy—that is, how the 
police believe they are viewed by the public (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Perceived audience 
legitimacy shapes officers’ orientations toward their job and may ultimately explain the way they 
interact with members of the public. For example, officers who perceive greater audience 
legitimacy express more support for a democratic approach to policing, including the installation 
of citizen oversight bodies (Kang and Nalla, 2011), and are more likely to use procedural justice 
when interacting with citizens (Bradford and Quinton, 2014; Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz, 2018). 
Further, officers who believe they possess higher levels of audience legitimacy tend to view 
citizens as more cooperative, though this relationship appears to vary by neighborhood 
conditions (Nix, 2017a).   
 The idea that officers’ perceptions of their legitimacy in the public eye would explain the 
way they approach their job is consistent with the police culture literature, which has 
documented the salience of officer cynicism and its effects (Muir, 1977; Niederhoffer, 1967). 
Cynical cops embrace an aggressive style of policing—they “believe that the citizenry is hostile 
to police” and “see themselves as a principally negative force in peoples’ lives” (Worden, 1995: 
58). They express job dissatisfaction (Regoli, Crank, and Culbertson, 1989) and more frequently 
engage in problematic behaviors (Hickman, 2008). Yet, in this literature, the conceptualization 
and measurement of cynicism has been broad, overlooking important nuances and causal 
relations between the presumed components of officer perceptions. For example, researchers 
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have employed measures that combine officers’ perceptions of citizens’ attitudes, citizens’ 
behaviors, and the favorability of media coverage (Niederhoffer, 1967; Regoli, 1976; Regoli, 
Crank, and Rivera, 1990). Such broad measures inhibit our ability to understand fully what 
impacts officers’ orientations.  
Perceived audience legitimacy refers to how officers believe their community views 
them—a judgment they likely make based on how citizens actually behave toward them. Officers 
who recently have been disrespected by citizens (i.e., had their legitimacy challenged) may be 
more likely to generalize such treatment to the larger community, believing that most citizens 
exhibit animus toward police, and do not view them as a legitimate authority. In addition to 
direct contact with hostile citizens, media coverage of police work may also influence officers’ 
perceptions of audience legitimacy. Recent studies indicate that media coverage of policing has 
increased officers’ apprehension in the post-Ferguson era (Nix and Pickett, 2017; Wolfe and Nix, 
2016). Indeed, this may explain why officers in some cities have become less proactive in recent 
years (Morgan and Pally, 2016; Shjarback et al., 2017). This would be consistent with the 
dialogic model of police legitimacy: officers perceive that hostile media coverage, because of its 
influence on the public and representation of its views, undermines police legitimacy, and adjust 
their behaviors in response (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Thus, to the extent that media 
coverage influences officers’ perceived audience legitimacy, it is likely also to affect officers’ 
approach to policing. 
At the same time, the broader social context may also shape officers’ perceptions of 
audience legitimacy and subsequent behavioral responses. Research suggests officers use force 
more often in areas characterized by racial and economic inequality (Sorensen, Marquart, and 
Brock, 1993), as well as in areas with higher rates of violence (Jacobs and Britt, 1979; Jacobs 
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and O’Brien, 1998; Klinger et al., 2016). Perceived audience legitimacy might explain such 
ecological variation in police use of force. That is, community characteristics such as 
racial/ethnic heterogeneity and violent crime rates may shape officers’ perceptions of audience 
legitimacy and, in turn, influence the occurrence of force. Violent crime rates and the 
size/growth of the minority population likely act as cognitive heuristics to officers, signaling the 
extent to which the community supports the police (Moon and Zager, 2007; Nix, 2017b; 
Shjarback, Nix, and Wolfe, 2018) and in turn influencing their policing style (Klinger, 1997). 
Unfortunately, we know little about the sources of perceived audience legitimacy among 
officers. This is an important research gap given the current state of affairs in the United States, 
where policing has been under the microscope for the last several years (Weitzer, 2015). To 
advance the literature, we develop a theoretical model of the sources of audience legitimacy and 
test this model using two separate surveys conducted in 2018: the first with a sample of police 
officers from a large agency in a southern US city (N = 546), and the second with a national 
probability sample of police executives (N = 665). Our findings suggest that perceived citizen 
animus and community violence are associated with perceived audience legitimacy, but minority 
population size and growth are not. Further, personal experience with citizen disrespect 
influences perceived audience legitimacy indirectly, through its direct association with global 
perceptions of citizen animus.  
THE CONSTRUCT OF AUDIENCE LEGITIMACY 
Since Tyler’s (1990) seminal study, audience legitimacy has received a great deal of 
attention in the criminological literature (e.g., Jackson et al., 2012; Mazerolle et al., 2013; 
McLean, Wolfe, and Pratt, 2018; Wolfe et al., 2016). Yet, interestingly, scholars disagree on the 
conceptualization of legitimacy. On the one hand, Tyler (2003: 310) contends that citizens’ 
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internal sense of obligation to obey authorities is “the most direct extension of the concept of 
legitimacy,” and is strongly influenced by perceived fairness of authorities when exercising their 
power (see e.g., Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Huo, 2002). On the other 
hand, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) argue that obligation to obey cannot be equated to 
legitimacy, as people can feel compelled to obey authorities for reasons apart from legitimacy. 
For example, while perceived legitimacy undoubtedly causes some people to feel obligated to 
obey authorities, others might obey due to fear of the consequences of disobedience, while still 
others might feel powerless and see no realistic alternative to obedience (i.e., “dull compulsion,” 
see Carrabine, 2004:180). Given these possibilities, Tankebe (2013: 105-106) argues that 
obligation to obey “can be considered a ‘dependent variable,’ sometimes explained by perceived 
legitimacy, and sometimes not…to the extent that legitimacy and obligation are conceptually 
distinct, conflating them can only obstruct efforts to understand both concepts.”  
He maintains that legitimacy is comprised of three overarching dimensions: lawfulness, shared 
values, and consent (see Beetham, 1991; Coicaud, 2002; Weber, 1978).  
Shared values can be further broken down into procedural fairness, distributive fairness, 
and effectiveness, according to Tankebe. Citing the “rise of universalism” (Wilson, 1993) in 
modern society, Tankebe (2013: 111) argues there is a “shared aspiration in liberal democracies 
that citizens possess equal self-worth and dignity that should not be violated.” In other words, 
fair treatment (in terms of procedures and the distribution of outcomes) is a normative value that 
must be shared by legitimate authorities and those subject to their power. Additionally, 
legitimate authorities must demonstrate effectiveness in dealing with crime and disorder so as to 
“satisfy the ends which justify its enormous concentration of power” (Beetham, 1991: 137). 
Though often considered an instrumental concern that factors into the legitimation of police, 
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Tankebe (2013: 112) considers effectiveness a “normative condition for their legitimacy” (see 
also Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012: 146-47). Based partly on the results of a confirmatory factor 
analysis of survey data from more than 4,000 Londoners, Tankebe (2013:125) submits that 
“what police researchers have persistently tended to use as predictors of legitimacy (procedural 
fairness, distributive fairness, lawfulness, and effectiveness) are rather the constituent parts of 
legitimacy” (see also Sun et al., 2018; Tankebe et al., 2016). However, it bears clarifying these 
results do not confirm that this proposed four-dimensional construct represents legitimacy (see 
Jackson and Bradford, 2019).  
Despite the lack of consensus on what constitutes legitimacy, there is substantial 
agreement that procedural fairness, distributive fairness, lawfulness, and effectiveness are very 
closely related to audience legitimacy. That is, they are either legitimacy per se, as Tankebe 
(2013) claims, or they are the most important and proximate antecedents of legitimacy, as others 
claim (Jackson and Bradford, 2019; Tyler, 2003). We revisit this point in the conclusion, when 
we discuss the implications of our findings. In any event, the evidence accumulated to date 
suggests when citizens recognize police authority as legitimate (however measured), they are 
more likely to comply with officers during interactions, and to abide by the law when the police 
are not present (see e.g., Walters and Bolger, 2018). When officers lack legitimacy, they must 
rely more on coercive tactics to achieve compliance. Yet, how do officers come to realize how 
much legitimacy they have (or do not have) in the eyes of citizens? As Bottoms and Tankebe 
(2012: 129) point out, police legitimacy entails more than how citizens feel about the police—it 
is a continuous and relational dialogue involving both police (as power-holders) and citizens (as 
the audience to their power): 
[T]hose in power (or seeking power) in a given context make a claim to be the 
legitimate ruler(s); then members of the audience respond to this claim; the 
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power-holder might adjust the nature of the claim in light of the audience’s 
response; and this process repeats itself. 
A crucial part of this ongoing dialogue—the decision whether to adjust their claim to 
legitimacy—results from officers’ perceived audience legitimacy (or lack thereof).  
Relative to the large body of literature on police legitimacy from the citizen’s 
perspective, very few studies have focused on police officers’ perceptions of their audience 
legitimacy (Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz, 2014; Nix, 2017b). Such perceptions appear to be 
significant. For example, officers who perceive greater audience legitimacy exhibit a greater 
willingness to exercise procedural justice with citizens (Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz, 2018), and 
consistent with Bottoms and Tankebe’s theory, have higher levels of self-legitimacy, which 
subsequently increases commitment to community partnerships (Wolfe and Nix, 2016) and 
decreases reliance on coercive force to gain control over encounters (Tankebe and Meško, 2015). 
Given such prosocial outcomes, research is needed that sheds light on the antecedents of 
perceived audience legitimacy. 
THEORIZING THE SOURCES OF PERCEIVED AUDIENCE LEGITIMACY 
What factors affect officers’ perceptions of their audience legitimacy? The extant 
literature suggests several possibilities, including officers’ perceptions of how they are treated by 
citizens and the media, and the broader community context in which they work. 
EXPERIENCES WITH CITIZEN DISRESPECT 
Citizen disrespect communicates to officers that they are not viewed as legitimate. As 
Van Maanen (1978: 316) observed, officers take it as an indication “that their position and 
authority in the interaction are not being taken seriously.” Such a legitimacy challenge may 
partially explain why officers respond more punitively to disrespectful citizens (Van Maanen, 
1978; Westley, 1970). Decades of research focused on the dynamics of police-citizen 
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interactions demonstrates that officers are more likely to arrest hostile and/or noncompliant 
citizens (Klinger, 1994; Lundman, 1994; Piliavan and Briar, 1964; Worden and Shepard, 1996) 
and use higher levels of force when citizens are physically resistant (Alpert and Dunham, 2004; 
Terrill, 2001). Disrespect by citizens also triggers other, less punitive behavioral responses from 
officers (Mastrofski, Reisig, and McCluskey, 2002). For example, a pair of experiments by Nix 
and colleagues (2017) revealed that officers placed less importance on exercising procedural 
justice with disrespectful citizens. Similarly, Pickett and Nix (2019) showed that officers are 
more likely to support aggressive styles of policing if they believe citizens treat officers unfairly 
and disrespectfully. One potential explanation for findings such as these is that disrespect signals 
compromised legitimacy, and that the encounter necessitates a more punitive response.  
The effects of citizen disrespect likely extend beyond the interaction level and contribute 
to officers’ general outlooks and expectations. Toch (1996: 107) reminds us that repeated 
exposure to citizen disrespect can have a cumulative effect on officers, such that they can be seen 
as “composite[s] of the incidents in which [they have] been involved.” Van Maanen (1978: 311-
15) similarly argued that the “experientially based meanings” that officers learn to ascribe to 
citizens are “sustained and continually reaffirmed through [their] everyday activity.” Canteen 
talk provides additional opportunities for officers to be exposed vicariously to citizen disrespect, 
via their peers’ experiences (Waddington, 1999). As their direct and vicarious experiences with 
disrespectful treatment by citizens increases, officers’ perceived audience legitimacy likely 
decreases, which may in turn influence their outlook and policing style. A recent study by Pickett 
and Ryon (2017) provides preliminary support for such a causal process. In their national survey, 
officer support for due process reforms in policing (e.g., early intervention systems, civilian 
oversight, sensitivity training) was significantly associated with the global belief that citizens are 
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fair and respectful when interacting with officers. Perceived audience legitimacy is likely the key 
mechanism that would explain this relationship. Officers who believe citizens are generally fair 
and respectful towards the police likely believe they have greater legitimacy in the public eye, 
and thus are not opposed to policing reforms meant to expand due process protections and citizen 
oversight.  
MEDIA COVERAGE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 Another possible antecedent of perceived audience legitimacy is the extent to which 
officers believe the news media are hostile toward law enforcement. Communications studies 
suggest individuals frequently harbor hostile media perceptions—the belief that media coverage 
is biased against their group (Hansen and Kim, 2011; Rojas, 2010; Vallone, Ross, and Leeper, 
1985). Moreover, individuals tend to believe the media influence other peoples’ attitudes and 
behaviors (Paul, Salwen, and Dupagne, 2000; Sun, Pan, and Shen, 2008), which in turn exerts 
causal effects on their own attitudes and behaviors (Rojas, 2010; Tal-Or et al., 2010). 
In his classic survey of New York police officers, Niederhoffer (1967: 234) found that 
the vast majority believed newspapers “seem to enjoy giving an unfavorable slant to news 
concerning the police, and prominently play up police misdeeds rather than virtues.” Accurate or 
not, these attitudes persist today. In a survey of police officers at a southeastern U.S. agency, Nix 
and Pickett (2017) found that officers who felt the media were more hostile toward policing (i.e., 
negative, unfair, deceptive, unreliable) were more likely to think citizen distrust, noncompliance, 
and animus toward police had increased from 2014 to 2016. In a separate agency, Wolfe and Nix 
(2016) found that officers reported being less motivated as a result of negative publicity 
surrounding law enforcement post-Ferguson, and expressed less desire to collaborate with their 
community to solve problems. Notably, both studies used coarse measures of media perceptions 
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that did not distinguish local versus national media – but recent work suggests officers view local 
media as more impactful to their organization than national media (Matusiak, 2019). We expect 
officers’ perceptions of local media to be more consequential than their perceptions of national 
media, given local media’s focus on stories closest to home and on the officers’ agency 
specifically. Officers who believe the local media are hostile toward police are likely to believe 
this coverage undermines their legitimacy in the eyes of the local community (Crank and 
Langworthy, 1992).  
VIOLENT CRIME IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY  
 Danger perception theory posits that officer aggression—namely, the use of force—is 
driven by real or perceived danger (Goldkamp, 1976; Jacobs and Britt, 1979). The extant 
literature generally supports this contention: officers working in areas with higher rates of 
community violence tend to use nonlethal and lethal force more frequently (Fyfe, 1980; Lee 
Vaughn, and Lim, 2014; Lim, Fridell, and Lee, 2014; Terrill and Reisig, 2003). Klinger and 
colleagues’ (2016) analysis in St. Louis suggests the amount of firearm violence in a community 
predicts the use of lethal force by officers. In their study, the racial composition of 
neighborhoods did not have a direct relationship with officer-involved shootings, but it did have 
an indirect relationship through its relationship with firearm violence. Neighborhoods with 
moderate levels of firearm violence experienced more officer-involved shootings; however, 
officers apparently stayed away from neighborhoods with the highest levels of firearm violence 
(see also, Klinger, 1997). 
Officers’ experiences working in violent communities may condition them to expect 
more citizen noncompliance, disrespect, and violence directed toward the police (Smith and 
Alpert, 2007). The level of violent crime in a jurisdiction—to the extent that it is perceived by 
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officers—likely serves as a partial indicator of the degree to which the public supports the police 
(Moon and Zager, 2007; Nix, 2017b). In other words, the violent crime rate is used as a cognitive 
heuristic when officers think about the level of legitimacy they garner from the public. Officers 
are likely to believe they have less legitimacy in areas with higher levels of violence, and, in 
turn, police those areas more aggressively than places with less violence. Or, in areas with the 
highest levels of violence, officers may reason that their legitimacy has been entirely 
compromised, and respond by de-policing. In any event, we expect crime rates, real or perceived, 
to be significantly associated with officers’ perceptions of audience legitimacy independent of 
their direct experiences with citizen disrespect.  
MINORITY GROUP SIZE AND GROWTH  
Nonwhite citizens generally express less confidence in and support of the police (Tuch 
and Weitzer, 1997). Blacks’ and Hispanics’ confidence, in particular, has deteriorated since 
Ferguson (Norman, 2017). Similar to our discussion of violent crime rates, community 
racial/ethnic composition also may be used by officers as a mental shortcut for estimating the 
level of legitimacy they possess in the eyes of the community. Officers working in 
predominantly black/Hispanic neighborhoods may adopt a more aggressive approach to policing, 
reasoning that their compromised legitimacy in those neighborhoods generates noncompliance 
and a lack of cooperation among residents. Indeed, prior studies have found that racial 
composition is associated with such policing outcomes as arrest rates (Liska and Chamlin, 1984; 
Liska, Chamlin, and Reed, 1985) and the use of nonlethal and lethal force (Jacobs and O’Brien, 
1998; Lersch et al., 2008; Liska and Yu, 1992; Smith, 1986). Focusing on ethnic composition, 
Holmes et al. (2018) recently found a significant relationship between percent Hispanic and 
police-caused homicides of Hispanics across 230 cities. To date, however, we have no empirical 
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evidence concerning whether the racial/ethnic composition of a community influences officers’ 
perceived audience legitimacy. If so, this could help clarify why such ecological factors are 
associated with officer behaviors. 
Alternatively, the racial threat hypothesis posits that as the relative size of the minority 
population increases in an area, the majority group perceives greater threat—economic, political, 
cultural, or criminal—and in turn, the criminal justice system is used as a tool to suppress the 
minority population, thereby protecting the majority’s status (Blalock, 1967; Horowitz, 1985). 
For instance, in areas where the size of the minority population is larger, white citizens are more 
fearful (Pickett et al. 2012), tend to be more supportive of punitive crime control policies 
(Baumer et al., 2003; King and Wheelock, 2007), and exhibit greater empowerment of the police 
(Holmes et al., 2008; Stults and Baumer, 2007). The community’s racialized fears should be 
evident to police officers, and perhaps factor into their judgments about the legitimacy they hold 
in the eyes of community members. As but one example, officers working in areas experiencing 
a recent growth in minority populations may sense increased fear of crime among white citizens, 
believing that it undermines their legitimacy in the eyes of those who comprise the majority of 
the community. If so, this could explain some of the relationships researchers have documented 
between population makeup (i.e., percent minority, change in percent minority) and various 
policing outcomes, like use of force (Sorensen et al., 1993), searches (Novak and Chamlin, 
2012), and misconduct (Kane, 2002), among others.    
 HYPOTHESES AND CURRENT FOCUS  
 Based on our review of the literature, we tested the following hypotheses with our 
studies. 
H1. Officers who have recently been disrespected by citizens will perceive lower levels of 
audience legitimacy. 
13 
 
H2. Officers who perceive greater citizen animus in general will perceive lower levels of 
audience legitimacy. 
H3. Officers who believe local media are more hostile toward law enforcement will 
perceive lower levels of audience legitimacy. 
H4. Officers who believe crime is increasing will perceive lower levels of audience 
legitimacy. 
H5. Actual violent crime rates will be inversely associated with perceived audience 
legitimacy. 
H6. In areas where the relative size of the minority population is larger or has grown 
recently, officers will perceive lower levels of audience legitimacy. 
We tested these hypotheses with two samples of police officers—the first sample 
consisting of patrol officers from a southern U.S. police department and the second study 
consisting of a national sample of police chief executives. It was necessary to examine the 
predictors of perceived audience legitimacy in different studies for several reasons. First, there is 
an ongoing debate regarding the conceptualization of audience legitimacy. Tyler (1990) argues 
that legitimacy is comprised of two elements: trust and obligation to obey. Alternatively, 
Tankebe (2013) contends that perceived obligation to obey the police is an outcome of 
legitimacy, rather than a component of it. He argues that legitimacy is comprised of perceived 
police procedural justice, distributive justice, lawfulness, and effectiveness (see also Sun et al., 
2018; Tankebe, Reisig, and Wang, 2016). Although we do not take a position on this debate, we 
are wary of the potential for mono-operation bias (Shadish et al., 2002), and as such, believe it is 
important to ensure our results are robust to the measurement of legitimacy. Accordingly, Study 
1 uses a Tylerian measure of audience legitimacy comprised of trust and obligation to obey. 
Study 2, in contrast, operationalizes audience legitimacy in a manner consistent with Tankebe 
and colleagues’ conceptualization.   
Second, analyzing data from a single agency sample (Study 1) allowed us to examine the 
relationship between officers’ subjective perceptions of changes in their local crime rate on 
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perceived audience legitimacy. Study 2, the national sample of chief executives, provided the 
opportunity to examine whether an objective measure of the crime rate had a similar effect on 
perceived audience legitimacy. These different operationalizations of crime allow us to assess 
the validity of our theoretical claims. Third, it is valuable to have empirical results from samples 
comprised of different types of police officers because it sheds light on whether the predictors of 
audience legitimacy are unique to a particular officer type (i.e., line-level vs. executive), agency, 
jurisdiction type (e.g., population size, political climate), or US region. 
STUDY 1 
METHOD 
For our first study, we administered a survey to a large police department in a southern 
US city. The city has a large population (>100,000) that is rapidly growing—having increased by 
approximately 17% from 2010 to 2016. Sixty-eight percent of its residents are white, 8 percent 
are black, 6 percent are Asian, and the remainder belongs to some other race. One-third of the 
population is of Hispanic or Latino decent. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Uniform Crime Report (UCR), the overall violent crime rate in the metropolitan statistical area 
has increased slightly in recent years (from 2014 to 2016).  
In January 2018, with the help of an executive lieutenant, we invited all 1,752 sworn 
employees to participate in an anonymous online survey. The executive lieutenant sent three 
reminder emails over the next two weeks, with the data collection period ending in early 
February. We used a self-administered web-based survey to minimize social desirability bias, 
although we knew it would likely yield a low response rate (Tourangeau, Conrad, and Couper, 
2013). Response rates to police surveys have declined over the past decade (Nix et al., 2019), 
and computerized surveys of police officers have tended to obtain low response rates: 21% 
15 
 
(Donner, Fridell, and Jennings, 2016), 25% (Skogan, 2015), 28% (Reynolds and Helfers, 2018), 
and “just over 30%” (Bradford and Quinton, 2014: 1032). Similar to this literature, 546 out of 
the 1,752 officers invited to participate in our survey did so, resulting in a 31% response rate. We 
are not especially concerned about the response rate because the demographics of our sample 
closely resembled those of the agency, and because we are able test the generalizability of the 
findings in a second survey.1 There is also a weak relationship between response rates and 
nonresponse bias (Peytcheva, 2013; Pickett et al., 2018).  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: AUDIENCE LEGITIMACY 
We asked officers to indicate their level of agreement (1=strongly agree to 5=strongly 
disagree) with the following statements: “Most civilians feel an obligation to obey police 
officers,” “Most civilians believe they should do what the police say, even if they disagree,” and 
“Most civilians believe this department can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the 
people in their neighborhood.” We reverse coded the items so that higher scores indicated greater 
agreement, and averaged responses to generate a mean index, audience legitimacy (α=.87). 
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in Study 1 are presented in Table 1. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
Recently Disrespected 
Our first predictor variable captured officers’ direct experiences with citizen disrespect. 
We asked officers how many times civilians had done each of the following to them in the past 
year while they were on duty: (1) called you names, (2) treated you with disrespect, and (3) 
                                                 
1 In terms of gender and race, 90% of respondents were male (vs. 90% of the agency) and 67% were white non-
Hispanics (vs. 69% of the agency). In terms of age, 17% of the sample were fifty or older (vs. 14% of the agency), 
44% were in their forties (vs. 40% of the agency), 32% were in their thirties (vs. 36% of the agency), and 7% were 
in their twenties (vs. 11% of the agency). 
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verbally abused you. Answer choices included 1=never, 2=one to three times, 3=four to six 
times, 4=seven to nine times, and 5=ten or more times (Weitzer and Tuch, 2006). We averaged 
responses to these three questions to generate a mean index (α=.95), with higher scores 
indicating more direct exposure to disrespectful citizens in the past year.  
Citizen Animus 
Realizing that direct exposure to citizen disrespect accumulates over time (Toch, 1996), 
and that officers may additionally be vicariously exposed to citizen disrespect, we measured 
respondents’ global perceptions of how citizens treat police officers. We asked respondents to 
indicate their level of agreement (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree) with seven 
statements: (1) People often disrespect and insult the police, (2) People are normally polite when 
dealing with the police, (3) People treat police officers with dignity, (4) People treat the police 
worse than they treat other government employees, (5) People treat police officers unfairly, (6) 
People normally listen to the police before jumping to conclusions in incidents, and (7) People 
will ignore or walk away from the police when officers try to explain a situation (Pickett and 
Ryon, 2017). Theoretically, officers’ perceptions of citizen behavior are distinct from, and a 
cause of, their perceptions of audience legitimacy. Supporting this theoretical assumption, a 
promax-rotated factor analysis indicated that the animus items loaded onto a separate factor than 
the audience legitimacy items, with acceptable pattern loadings (see Appendix A). We averaged 
responses to the items to generate a mean index, citizen animus (α=.82), whereby higher scores 
reflect the global belief that citizens treat police officers disrespectfully and unfairly.2  
  
                                                 
2 As noted by a reviewer, citizen animus and recently disrespected are conceptually similar. There is a moderate 
bivariate correlation between the two scales (r = .46; see Appendix B, Table B1), but factor analysis (with promax 
rotation) indicated the individual items used to construct each scale load on separate factors. The full pattern matrix 
for this analysis is available on request.  
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Perceived Crime Trend  
In this study, we use a perceptual measure of crime, but in study 2, we use an objective 
measure based on FBI data. For study 1, we asked respondents the following question: “In your 
best judgment, has the overall crime rate in [city blinded] increased or decreased over the past 
three years?” Answer choices included 1 = decreased greatly, 2 = decreased, 3 = stayed about the 
same, 4 = increased, and 5 = increased greatly.  
CONTROLS  
In our analyses, we controlled for officers’ gender (1 = male), race/ethnicity, (1 = non-
Hispanic white), and education (1 = four-year degree or higher). In addition, we controlled for 
years of experience with a continuous variable, and rank with two dummy variables, front-line 
supervisor (i.e., corporal or sergeant) and upper management (i.e., lieutenant, commander, 
assistant chief, or chief). Police officer is the reference category.  
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
 Because the outcome (audience legitimacy) was a mean index that approximated a 
normally distributed continuous variable, we used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
equations to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. Due to evidence of heteroscedasticity of error terms, we 
estimated our models using robust standard errors. Collinearity did not appear to be a problem. 
All variance inflation factors fell below 3.0 (mean VIF=1.39), and all bivariate correlations were 
less than |.60| (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). As is common in survey research, respondents 
sometimes skipped over questions, resulting in item-missing data for some of the variables in our 
analyses. To account for this, we used multiple imputation (m=25; see e.g., Allison, 2002; 
McKnight et al., 2007; Rubin, 1996). Multiple imputation avoids the bias that can be created by 
listwise deletion and helps maintain power by, for example, retaining respondents in the analysis 
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who were missing a value for one item out of a larger scale (Sterne et al., 2009).3 The mean of 
our dependent variable did not differ significantly between respondents with no item-missing 
data and respondents with missing data on one or more variables, suggesting our data satisfied 
the Missing At Random (MAR) assumption.4 Finally, we meet the general recommendation to 
have at least 20 respondents per variable in our statistical models (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007), 
and our sample size is sufficient for having approximately 80% power to detect pre-specified 
individual regression coefficients for medium-sized effects (Maxwell, 2004). 
RESULTS 
 Before discussing our multivariate results, it is instructive to examine more closely the 
distributions of our dependent and predictor variables. Audience legitimacy ranged from 1 to 5 
with a mean of 3.48 (SD = .78). Roughly 46% of respondents scored 4 or higher on this scale, 
indicating a large portion of the sample agreed citizens in their community trust the police and 
feel obligated to obey them. Recently disrespected ranged from 1 to 5 with a mean of 3.33 (SD = 
1.39). On the one hand, 6.5% of the sample scored 1 on this scale – indicating they had never 
been called names, treated disrespectfully, or verbally abused while on duty in the past year. On 
the other hand, nearly 30% of the sample scored 5 on the scale, indicating frequently being 
disrespected while on duty. Citizen animus ranged from 1.57 to 5 with a mean of 3.42 (SD = 
.66). Roughly 23% of the sample scored 4 or higher on this scale, indicating they agree citizens 
generally treat police badly. Finally, perceived crime trend ranged from 1 to 5 with a mean of 
3.75 (SD = .77). Seventy percent of the sample believed crime had increased or increased greatly 
over the past three years, while 22% felt it had stayed about the same, and the remaining 8% felt 
it had decreased or decreased greatly. 
                                                 
3 We obtained substantively similar results using listwise deletion (available on request).  
4 “Complete data” group mean = 3.496 vs. “Some missing data” group mean = 3.359 (t = 1.180, p = .24). 
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Turning to our multivariate analyses, Model 1 in Table 2 presents the results of an OLS 
model that regressed perceived audience legitimacy onto recently disrespected and each of our 
control variables. Consistent with our first hypothesis, officers’ recent experiences with citizen 
disrespect were significantly and inversely associated with their perceived audience legitimacy 
(b = -.154, p < .001). In Model 2, we regressed perceived audience legitimacy onto citizen 
animus and the controls. The results supported our second hypothesis: citizen animus was 
strongly and inversely associated with perceived audience legitimacy (b = -.464, p < .001). 
Model 3 presents the results of an OLS model that regressed perceived audience legitimacy onto 
perceived crime trend along with the controls. The results are supportive of Hypothesis 4, 
indicating that perceived crime trend (b = -.185, p < .001) is significantly and inversely 
associated with perceived audience legitimacy. Rank was significant in this model as well, with 
front-line supervisors (b = .225, p = .009) and upper management (b = .371, p = .005) perceiving 
significantly higher levels of audience legitimacy.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In Model 4 of Table 2, all three predictors were included in the regression equation, and 
the results provided further support for Hypothesis 2. Independent of their recent experiences 
with citizen disrespect and their perceptions of the crime trend, officers who perceived higher 
levels of citizen animus (b = -.394, p < .001) reported significantly lower levels of audience 
legitimacy. The direct effect of recent experience with citizen disrespect was reduced to 
nonsignificance; but, perceived crime trend (b = -.096, p = .023) remained significantly and 
inversely associated with perceived audience legitimacy.  
However, consistent with our theoretical discussion above, it is possible that officers’ 
experience with citizen disrespect is one element in the accumulation of their views of citizen 
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animus more generally. If so, citizen disrespect may be indirectly related to perceived audience 
legitimacy through perceptions of general citizen animus. In other words, recent experiences 
with citizen disrespect may increase officers’ global perceptions of citizen animus, which in turn 
shape perceived audience legitimacy. We tested for an indirect effect using a Sobel test with 
bootstrap confidence intervals (Hayes, 2013; Zhao, Lynch, and Chen, 2010). This analysis 
indicated that recent experience with citizen disrespect had a statistically significant indirect 
association with perceived audience legitimacy, through citizen animus (b = -.088, p < .001, 95% 
CI = -.118 to -.059).5  That is, officers’ personal experiences with disrespect in the past year 
influenced their global assessments of how citizens tend to behave toward police, which in turn 
shaped their perceptions of whether the public sanctions their legal authority.  
STUDY 2 
METHOD 
 For our second study, we conducted a survey with a national probability sample of 
municipal police chiefs. Using the National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators 
(NDLEA), we obtained the mailing addresses of 12,039 municipal police departments along with 
the names of their current police chief. We placed each of these departments into one of four 
strata based on the number of officers they employed: 0 to 24, 25 to 49, 50 to 99, and 100 or 
more.6 We then drew a random sample of 624 agencies from each stratum, resulting in a 
stratified random sample of 2,496 departments. 
 In February 2018, we pre-notified the chiefs of each police department in our sample 
about the survey via a postcard, which informed them of the upcoming mail survey and provided 
                                                 
5 Full results are available on request. 
6 The Bureau of Justice Statistics utilizes a similar sampling strategy (i.e., stratifying by agency size) for its Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey (see also Strom and Hickman, 2010).  
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a link to an online version if they preferred to take it at that time. One week later, we mailed the 
survey (along with a cover letter outlining the purpose of the study and their rights as research 
participants) to the chief of each department in our sample. Again, they were given the option to 
complete the survey online if they preferred. We then mailed surveys along with reminder letters 
to those who had yet to respond approximately two weeks later (Dillman et al., 2009). We 
received 675 surveys (369 by mail, 306 online) by the time data collection ended in mid-April, 
resulting a 27% response rate.7 As noted previously, the best available evidence indicates survey 
response rate and non-response bias are only weakly correlated (Peytcheva, 2013; Pickett et al., 
2018). This evidence, coupled with other evidence that we discuss later, bolsters our confidence 
that this sample is representative of the population from which it was drawn. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: AUDIENCE LEGITIMACY 
There is an ongoing debate among criminologists about the proper conceptualization of 
legitimacy (Reisig et al., 2007; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler and Jackson, 2014). Most often, 
researchers have measured audience legitimacy similar to the way we did in Study 1, as 
obligation to obey. However, Tankebe (2013) has proposed a four dimensional construct 
consisting of procedural justice, distributive justice, lawfulness, and effectiveness. Mono-
operation bias occurs when researchers assume that any one measure, like the audience 
legitimacy scale used in Study 1, accurately taps some broader theoretical concept, like audience 
legitimacy, but the findings actually differ depending on the specific measures used (Shadish et 
al., 2002). Given the aforementioned debate about legitimacy, in an effort to minimize mono-
operation bias and threats to external validity, we used different survey questions to measure 
                                                 
7 We removed ten of the 675 respondents because one worked for a sheriff’s department, one worked for a village 
department that contracts with its state police force, and eight failed to provide enough information for us to 
determine which stratum from which they were sampled.  
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perceived audience legitimacy in this study, as well as surveying a different sample. This second 
study also enabled us to examine potential relationships between our dependent variable and 
additional, theoretically-germane variables. We asked respondents to indicate their agreement (1 
= strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree) with the following seven statements: Most residents 
believe the police… (1) are corrupt, (2) use rules and procedures that are fair to everyone, (3) 
clearly explain the reasons for their actions, (4) treat people with respect, (5) are biased against 
them, (6) do a good job tackling crime in the community, and (7) represent their values 
(Tankebe, 2013; Tankebe, Reisig, and Wang, 2016). Exploratory factor analysis indicated the 
seven items loaded onto a single construct (See Appendix A). We coded responses so that higher 
scores reflected greater perceived audience legitimacy and averaged them to create a mean index 
(α = .76). Descriptive statistics for each variable included in the analyses for Study 2 are 
presented in Table 3. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
PREDICTOR VARIABLES  
Citizen Animus 
We asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the same seven statements 
used to measure citizen animus in Study 1. As with Study 1, factor analysis with promax rotation 
indicated the citizen animus and audience legitimacy questions loaded onto separate factors (see 
Appendix A). Accordingly, we coded items so that higher scores reflected greater perceived 
animosity of citizens and averaged them to generate a mean index, citizen animus (α = .81).  
Hostile Media Perceptions 
According to Crank and Langworthy’s (1992:339) institutional theory of policing, the 
media represent one of many actors in an institutional environment “on whom departments 
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depend for legitimacy.” While several studies have examined the impact of media coverage on 
officers’ perceptions, our study goes beyond much of the existing research by measuring views 
about both national and local media (Nix and Pickett, 2017). Per our theory, and prior work, 
perceptions of local media should be most important since agencies have stronger relationships 
with local news organizations and often lean on them to communicate with the public (Chermak 
and Weiss, 2005; Surrette, 2001). Matusiak (2019), for example, asked police chiefs in Texas 
how impactful 26 stakeholders – including national and local media – were to their organization 
(0 = not important at all to 5 = extreme importance). The sample rated local media’s impact as 
more important than national media (means = 3.82 and 1.59, respectively). In multivariate 
analyses, local media perceptions were inversely associated, whereas national media perceptions 
were positively associated, with the organizational goal of prioritizing law and order (see also 
Matusiak et al. 2017).  
We asked respondents to consider how the media portrays law enforcement, both 
nationally and locally. They were asked whether “NATIONAL MEDIA COVERAGE of law 
enforcement” is (1) positive or negative, (2) fair or unfair, (3) truthful or untruthful, and (4) 
reliable or unreliable. For each question, respondents were asked to answer on a four-point item-
specific response scale (e.g., 1 = very positive, 2 = positive, 3 = negative, 4 = very negative). We 
then presented respondents with the same set of questions as they pertained to “LOCAL MEDIA 
COVERAGE of their agency.” Responses to these eight items loaded onto two factors with 
acceptable loadings (national media = .75 to .83, local media = .84 to .86). As such, we created 
two mean indexes, hostile national media (α = .88) and hostile local media (α = .93), wherein 
higher scores reflect a belief that media coverage of the police is more hostile.  
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Average Violent Crime Rate 
Using UCR data, we calculated each jurisdiction’s average violent crime rate from 2014 
to 2016.8 For each year, we divided the total number of murders and nonnegligent 
manslaughters, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults in each jurisdiction by its reported 
population and multiplied by 100,000. Similar to previous studies (Baumer et al., 2003), we 
averaged these annual rates to create a three-year average violent crime rate, which ranged from 
0 to 2,802 violent crimes per 100,000 citizens (mean = 349). In order to reduce the right skew of 
this variable, we used its natural log in our analyses.  
Minority Presence 
We used data from the 2016 American Community Survey’s (ACS) 5-year estimates to 
calculate the percentage of each city’s population who identified as (1) Black or African 
American alone or (2) Hispanic or Latino (of any race). Percent black ranged from 0 to 94.32 
(mean = 11.79) and percent Hispanic ranged from 0 to 93.66 (mean = 14.02). Both variables 
were right skewed, so we again used natural log transformations to normalize the distributions. 
The transformed versions of %Black and %Hispanic served as predictors in our analyses. We 
also obtained estimates of each city’s racial/ethnic makeup from the 2000 decennial census in 
order to calculate absolute changes in %Black and %Hispanic from 2000 to 2016. Change 
%Black ranged from -14.38 to 32.65 with a mean of 1.60. Change %Hispanic ranged from -7.24 
to 72.88 with a mean of 4.35. Both variables were skewed, so we used their natural log 
transformations in our analyses.  
  
                                                 
8 At the time of this writing, the 2017 UCR had not yet been published. 
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CONTROLS 
 We controlled for several respondent/agency characteristics in our models. We controlled 
for rank with a binary variable (1 = chief, 0 = other), as some surveys were completed by an 
officer other than the chief.9 We also controlled for respondents’ years of experience with a 
continuous variable and their level of education with a binary variable (1 = Master’s degree or 
higher, 0 = less than Master’s degree), as there is evidence that each is associated with 
cynicism/distrust of citizens (Paoline, Myers, and Worden, 2000; Shjarback et al., 2018; Sobol, 
2010). In addition, we controlled for the size of the respondent’s department, since chiefs of 
small departments are generally more accessible to the public (Brown, 1981) and may enjoy a 
more informal relationship with citizens (Kowalewski et al., 1984). Chiefs of larger departments, 
meanwhile, tend to be more cynical of their communities (Regoli, Crank, and Culbertson, 1989). 
We defined departments with 100 or more officers as a large agency (1 = yes, 0 = no). Although 
limited, there is evidence of a possible relationship between perceived audience legitimacy and 
officer race, gender, or the interaction of the two (Gau and Paoline, 2017; Paoline, 2000; 
Worden, 1993). Most of our sample reported being non-Hispanic white (89%) and male (94%). 
The small number of nonwhites and females would make resulting regression coefficients for 
separate binary control variables unstable. Therefore, we elected to control for race and gender 
with a single binary variable, white male (1 = yes, 0 = no).  
 We controlled for various community characteristics as well. Prior research has 
uncovered regional variation in terms of the danger officers face on the job, as measured by 
assaults (Wilson and Zhao, 2008) and felonious killings of officers (Kaminski, 2008). Such 
incidents are more prevalent in the southern United States, so it is plausible officers working in 
                                                 
9 Approximately 27% of respondents were not the chief of their department. However, the majority of these (over 
80%) were lieutenants, majors, commanders, deputy chiefs, or other high-ranking officers.   
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the South may perceive lower levels of audience legitimacy than do their counterparts from other 
regions. Region is measured with three dummy variables: Northeast, Midwest, and West (South 
is the reference group).10 Similarly, large cities and those with higher levels of unemployment 
tend to experience higher levels of crime, making it necessary to control for these factors as well 
(Chiricos, 1987; Nolan, 2004; Phillips and Land, 2012). The population size and unemployment 
rate of each department’s city were obtained from 2016 ACS 5-year estimates. Population size 
ranged from 126 to 2.2 million with a mean of approximately 63,000. Unemployment rate 
ranged from 0 to 27.2% with a mean of 7.47%. Both were highly skewed, so we used their 
natural log transformations as control variables in our models. Finally, studies suggest political 
conservatism is associated with various attitudes toward police, including support for the use of 
force (Gerber and Jackson, 2017; Silver and Pickett, 2015), militarization (Moule, Fox, and 
Parry, 2018), and overall confidence in police (Cao, Stack, and Sun, 1998). By extension, a 
jurisdiction’s political climate might influence officers’ perceptions of their audience legitimacy. 
Therefore, we controlled for the percentage of the county that voted for Donald Trump in 2016 
as a measure of the local political climate (Leip, 2018).  
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
Prior to analysis, we weighted the sample in order to account for the sampling design, 
which oversampled larger departments. As in Study 1, our outcome variable was a mean scale 
that approximated a normally distributed continuous variable. Accordingly, we used OLS 
regression to test hypotheses 2, 3, 5, and 6. Due to evidence of heteroscedasticity, we estimated 
models using robust standard errors. Collinearity did not appear to be a problem in any of the 
models. All variance inflation factors fell below 3.0 (mean VIF = 1.77), and none of the bivariate 
                                                 
10 Regions were defined as they are in the UCR. 
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correlations exceeded |.70| (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). As in Study 1, we used multiple 
imputation (m=25) to account for item-missing data (McKnight et al., 2007).11 Again, 
respondents with complete data and those with missing data on one or more variables were not 
significantly different in terms of their mean audience legitimacy, suggesting we met the Missing 
At Random assumption.12 The number of subjects per variable in each of our regression models 
well exceeds 20, and our sample size is sufficient for 80% power to detect pre-specified 
individual regression coefficients for medium-sized effects (Maxwell, 2004; Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007).  
RESULTS 
 Fifty-seven percent of this sample scored 4 or higher on audience legitimacy (mean = 
3.94, SD = .46), indicating the majority felt their communities believe police treat people fairly, 
act lawfully, and deal with crime effectively. Citizen animus ranged from 1 to 4.71 with a mean 
of 2.75 (SD = .64). Just 2% of the sample scored 4 or higher on this scale. Indeed, compared to 
officers employed at the southern agency surveyed in Study 1 (mean = 3.42, SD = .66), this 
sample of executives expressed significantly lower perceptions of citizen animus (t = -17.67, p < 
.001). Hostile local media ranged from 1 to 5 with a mean of 2.36 (SD = .71), whereas hostile 
national media ranged from 2 to 5 with a mean of 3.77 (SD = .70). The difference in means is 
statistically significant (t = -39.72, p < .001), and indicates respondents generally believe 
national media coverage of policing is more negative, unfair, untruthful and unreliable than local 
media coverage of their agency, specifically. To be sure, just 5% of the sample scored 4 or 
higher on hostile local media, whereas nearly 47% scored 4 or higher on hostile national media.   
                                                 
11 As in Study 1, results using listwise deletion were substantively similar (available on request).  
12 “Complete data” group mean = 3.932 vs. “Some missing” group mean = 3.866 (t = 1.483, p = .14). 
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Table 4 presents the results of our multivariate analyses. In Model 1, we regressed 
perceived audience legitimacy onto citizen animus along with the control variables. Supporting 
Hypothesis 2, citizen animus (b = -.297, p < .001) was significantly and inversely associated with 
perceived audience legitimacy. Population size (b = -.050, p = .046) and the unemployment rate 
(b = -.147, p = .011) were also significant, such that executives working in larger cities, and 
cities with higher levels of unemployment, perceived lower levels of audience legitimacy. In 
Model 2, we regressed hostile local and national media perceptions onto perceived audience 
legitimacy, as well as the controls. The results supported our third hypothesis, in that greater 
perceived hostility of the local media (b = -.170, p < .001) was inversely associated with 
perceived audience legitimacy. Perceived hostility of the national media was non-significant. 
Unemployment rate (b = -.202, p = .003) was again significantly associated with perceived 
audience legitimacy. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Model 3 of Table 4 presents the results of an OLS model that regressed audience 
legitimacy onto violent crime rate and the controls. The violent crime rate (b = -.060, p = .018) 
was significantly and inversely associated with perceived audience legitimacy, consistent with 
our fifth hypothesis. The unemployment rate again had an inverse relationship with perceived 
audience legitimacy, but the relationship was not statistically significant (b = -.142, p = .053). In 
Model 4, we regressed perceived audience legitimacy onto our minority presence measures, 
along with the controls. Percent black was statistically significant (b = -.064, p = .030), such that 
executives working in cities with a larger percentage of black residents perceived lower levels of 
audience legitimacy. This provides partial support for our sixth hypothesis, and it is worth noting 
that this effect was significant independent of variation in unemployment rate (which was itself 
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significant: b = -.156, p = .020). However, percent Hispanic was non-significant, as were 
changes in the percentage of the black and Hispanic populations.  
 Model 5 of Table 4 presents the results of an OLS model that regressed perceived 
audience legitimacy onto all of our predictor and control variables. The model provided further 
support for our second, third, and fifth hypotheses. Citizen animus (b = -.275, p < .001), hostile 
local media (b = -.098, p = .045), and violent crime rate (b = -.058, p = .020) were each 
significantly and inversely associated with perceived audience legitimacy. Percent black was 
rendered non-significant by the inclusion of these other predictors.  
DISCUSSION 
 Police officer behaviors have far-reaching impacts on their own lives, the lives of 
citizens, and the communities they are entrusted to protect (McLean et al., 2018). While most 
officer behaviors are beneficial to the public, some officer actions rise to the level of misconduct 
or complacency that can inhibit the fulfillment of public safety or directly harm citizens and 
officers. Therefore, it is necessary to gain solid understanding of the factors that shape line-level 
officers’ attitudes and behaviors, as well as those of higher-ranking officers. Perceived audience 
legitimacy—the extent to which officers believe the public views them as a legitimate 
authority—has recently emerged as an important predictor of numerous police-related outcomes. 
When officers believe the public trusts the police, defers to their power, and sanctions their 
authority, it provides the feeling of empowerment and confidence. In turn, officers who believe 
the public affords them more legitimacy are more likely to using democratic styles of policing 
and, ultimately, use force less frequently (Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz, 2018; Tankebe and 
Meško, 2015). Accordingly, we need to know what factors are associated with officers’ 
perceptions of audience legitimacy. Not only will this provide a deeper understanding of the 
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dynamics of audience legitimacy, it may also allow us to understand more fully why certain 
factors produce favorable or unfavorable officer behaviors. Our studies addressed these issues 
and, in this final section of the paper, we discuss the main findings and their theoretical and 
practical significance. 
 Citizen animus was strongly associated with perceived audience legitimacy in both of our 
studies. Patrol officers and executives who believed citizens, in general, display greater 
disrespect toward the police felt the public affords the police less legitimacy. This is not terribly 
surprising but, nonetheless, the finding adds to the broader literature on the dialogic model of 
legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). What is more interesting, however, is that in Study 1 
we found that officers who had more recent exposure to disrespectful citizens had lower 
perceived audience legitimacy, but this relationship was rendered statistically non-significant 
once we controlled for officers’ global views of citizen animus. Further analysis revealed that 
citizen animus mediated the effects of personal experience with disrespectful citizens. This 
suggests that direct citizen disrespect increases officers’ global belief that members of the public 
tend to be disrespectful toward the police, which subsequently diminishes their perceptions of 
audience legitimacy.  
 These findings inform our broader understanding of the development and effects of 
cynical orientations toward the public among police. The direct experience of disrespect likely 
has a cumulative effect and shapes officers’ opinions regarding citizens’ intentions, demeanors, 
and levels of cooperation (Niederhoffer, 1967; Toch, 1996). Our studies extend this literature by 
suggesting that officers’ global perceptions of citizen animus contribute to a cynical outlook in 
general and lead them to believe the public does not afford them legitimacy. This finding has 
important consequences for how officers may interact with the public. Perceived lack of 
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audience legitimacy will tend to make officers less likely to use democratic styles of policing 
(e.g., use procedural justice) and more likely to use force (Bradford and Quinton, 2014; Tankebe 
and Meško, 2015). Similarly, if “the organizational culture of police departments is shaped by 
the values articulated by their leaders” (Tyler, 2011: 261), agencies led by executives who 
perceive low levels of audience legitimacy may be less likely to engage with their community or 
listen to their concerns. For example, in Oregon, two sheriffs have recently directed their 
deputies to stop responding to calls for service inside Portland city limits, citing a “hostile 
environment” created by residents and politicians (Sparling, 2019). In other words, direct and 
vicarious experiences with citizen disrespect produce more cynical global views about citizens' 
behavioral tendencies toward police and, in turn, diminish perceptions of audience legitimacy, 
which may lead to less desirable police behaviors. 
 In Study 2, we found that hostile local media coverage of the police reduces perceptions 
of audience legitimacy. This suggests that local media may serve as a symbolic representative of 
the public in the eyes of management-level police officers. With this finding, we see that local 
media coverage of the police has implications for how executives feel and behave. Negative 
media coverage, while warranted in some situations, may further alienate the police from citizens 
and lead to behavioral adaptations like de-policing or, the opposite, more aggressive law 
enforcement (Shjarback et al., 2018) if their attitudes transfer to the rest of their agencies (Tyler, 
2011). In fact, the trickle-down model, which has been supported by a long line of organizational 
behavior research, would anticipate such a process (Mayer et al., 2009). The good news is two-
fold. First, this finding also suggests that positive media coverage of the police may improve 
executives’ views of citizen behavior and audience legitimacy. Second, we found that 
executives’ perceptions of hostile national-level media coverage of policing did not affect their 
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views concerning the amount of legitimacy their local community affords them. This suggests 
that the intense scrutiny of the police across the US may not necessarily have adverse effects on 
police attitudes and behaviors as much as we may have thought (Nix and Pickett, 2017; Wolfe 
and Nix, 2016). Indeed, policing is a local activity; our evidence suggests executives have the 
ability to separate other jurisdictions’ animosity toward the police from their own. 
 At the outset of these studies, we argued that officers’ experiences with citizen disrespect, 
cumulatively developed global views of citizen animus, and opinions of local media coverage 
were key explanatory variables of perceived audience legitimacy. Our findings supported this 
argument. Yet, we also contended that officers’ working environments play an important role in 
this process, consistent with danger perception theory. Much of the extant literature has tested 
danger perception theory with objective indicators of crime (e.g., levels of community violence), 
rather than perceived levels of danger. Accordingly, in Study 1, we measured officers’ 
perceptions of the crime trend in their jurisdiction. Officers who believed the crime rate had 
increased recently were less likely to believe the public views the police as a legitimate authority. 
Study 2 confirmed this relationship with management-level officers and by using an objective 
indicator of crime rate. We showed that executives who worked in areas with higher violent 
crime rates perceived less audience legitimacy, independent of their own views concerning 
citizen animus or hostile media coverage. This finding is consistent with prior studies that have 
tested danger perception theory, and coupled with findings from Study 1, suggests future 
research on the topic of audience legitimacy can utilize perceived or objective indicators of 
danger, as each yielded similar findings.  
The observed relationships between real/perceived crime and audience legitimacy also 
improves our understanding of the dialogic model—local policing context matters because it 
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serves as a cognitive heuristic when considering how much legitimacy the public affords the 
police. This mental shortcut is likely based in reality because communities with higher crime 
rates have higher rates of assaults on officers and lower levels of citizen cooperation (Kaminski, 
Jefferis, and Gu, 2003; Kaminski and Sorensen, 1995). Coupled with Shjarback and colleagues’ 
(2018) recent findings, the literature now provides compelling evidence that violent crime rates 
shape executives’ psychological orientations toward the public by increasing views of citizen 
animus, decreasing feelings of legitimacy from the public, and inhibiting confidence that the 
public will cooperate with officers. Such factors may prove to be important causal mechanisms 
that explain the long-established connection between community structural characteristics and 
neighborhood-level variation in officer use of force (Shjarback, 2018). Accordingly, the most 
pressing issue for future research aiming to build on our findings is to determine the extent to 
which officers’ perceptions of audience legitimacy mediate the link between violent crime rate 
(and other structural characteristics) and police use of force (and other important outcomes). We 
were limited in our ability to explore this full process because measuring officer use of force (or 
other potentially controversial outcomes) with survey methodologies is difficult. We hope our 
analyses motivate future research that connects survey data (e.g., regarding perceptions of 
audience legitimacy) with official, line-level officer data. 
Finally, we argued that the racial/ethnic makeup of a community also would serve as a 
cognitive heuristic for executives when thinking about how much legitimacy the public affords 
the police. The logic behind this argument was that because minorities have more negative views 
of the police (Carr, Napolitano, and Keating, 2007; Decker, 1981; Tyler, 2005), executives 
would perceive less audience legitimacy in jurisdictions with larger or growing minority 
populations. In a truncated model, we saw that the percentage of the population that was black 
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was associated with less perceived audience legitimacy, but this effect was diminished (to non-
significance) by the inclusion of perceived citizen animus, hostile media coverage, and violent 
crime rate. This suggests that the racial/ethnic makeup of a community is much less salient to 
executives when they assess the level of support they have from the public. Experience with 
citizen disrespect, perceived hostility of local media, and high violent crime levels are what 
appear to undermine perceived audience legitimacy. In some respects, we view this as an 
encouraging finding because many narratives suggest that breakdowns in police-community 
relations emanate from racial/ethnic animosity. At least in our studies, this does not necessarily 
appear to be the case when considering officers’ and executive officers’ opinions.  
While these findings add to the literature, it is important to acknowledge the limitations 
of our analyses. First, we employed an alternative measure of perceived audience legitimacy in 
Study 2: a four dimensional construct comprised of perceived procedural justice, distributive 
justice, lawfulness, and effectiveness in the eyes of the public. This is consistent with Tankebe’s 
(2013) theoretical reasoning, which derived from prior work by Weber (1978), Beetham (1991), 
and Coicaud (2002). Our motivation for using this alternative measure was not to pick a side in 
the debate about the appropriate conceptualization of legitimacy, but rather to be thorough. 
Indeed, to employ one set of measures, but not the other, would amount to picking a side in the 
absence of empirical evidence. As Jackson and Bradford (2019) pointed out, Tankebe’s (2013) 
analyses cannot be cited as evidence that his proposed conceptualization is more preferable than 
those who adopt the view that legitimacy is comprised of feelings of trust in and obligation to 
obey authorities. To be sure, “legitimacy is an abstract and unobservable psychological 
construct, and there are numerous ways to operationalise the perceived right to power, aside from 
the standard ways of institutional trust and/or normative alignment and/or obligation to obey” 
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(Jackson and Bradford, 2019: 22-23). Our supplemental analyses revealed that citizen animus 
was significantly and inversely associated with procedural justice, distributive justice, 
lawfulness, and effectiveness (see Appendix C). If we assume that legitimacy is best 
conceptualized as trust in the police and felt obligation to obey them, these findings suggest the 
effect of citizen animus on perceived audience legitimacy is slightly more distal, and may 
operate indirectly through its effect on perceived procedural justice, distributive justice, 
lawfulness, and/or effectiveness in the eyes of the public. Unfortunately, we could not test for 
this possibility, but we hope that future studies will endeavor to do so. In any event, Jackson and 
Bradford (2019:22) submit that “there is space for alternative approaches to measuring 
legitimacy,” and we concur. However, our studies cannot speak to which approach is superior.  
Second, our contextual indicators were city-level measures that cannot account for 
neighborhood heterogeneity, which could result in aggregation bias. Again, we hope future 
research builds on our findings by examining similar issues at the neighborhood level, 
particularly because police attitudes and behaviors can vary within patrol districts, squads, and 
shifts (Klinger, 1997). Third, the mediation analysis we conducted in Study 1 suggests that 
officers’ recent experiences with disrespectful citizens were indirectly associated with perceived 
audience legitimacy, through their direct effect on global perceptions of citizen animus. 
Although consistent with prior observations (Toch, 1996; Van Maanen, 1978), it is also possible 
that officers’ perceptions of citizen animus influence the way citizen interactions unfold and are 
interpreted by officers. For example, an officer who perceives higher levels of citizen animus 
may police more aggressively (Pickett and Nix, 2019), which could anger citizens and prompt 
them to curse at the officer, call him/her names, or exhibit otherwise disrespectful behaviors. In 
the case of this officer, experiences with citizens being disrespectful might be the more 
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proximate predictor of perceived audience legitimacy, as opposed to his/her global perceptions 
of citizen animus. As our data were cross sectional, we cannot rule out this possibility.    
Finally, the response rates in both studies were low, creating the potential for 
nonresponse bias. There is meta-analytic evidence from surveys of different populations (voters, 
employees, hospital patients) that response rates are weakly correlated with nonresponse bias 
(Groves and Peytcheva, 2008), but maybe it is different for police surveys. No evidence exists 
that it is, but it is possible. Nonresponse biases regression coefficients only when it induces a 
correlation between the regressors and the error term—that is, when the outcome causes 
nonresponse, or when the list of regressors excludes common causes of both nonresponse and the 
outcome (Solon et al., 2015; Winship and Radbill, 1994). We have no reason to believe this 
occurred in either study. The response distributions to several other questions on our surveys 
closely align with those elicited from similar questions on larger, nationally representative 
surveys conducted by the National Police Research Platform (Morin et al., 2017) and the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics (Hyland, 2018).13 This boosts our confidence that the results are unbiased. 
Further supplementary analyses (see Appendix C) support this assumption, and suggest that even 
if there is substantial nonresponse bias (an outcome-nonresponse correlation exceeding r = |.50|), 
the main substantive findings are unlikely to change. Nevertheless, future research should 
replicate our studies using data from police surveys with higher response rates.     
In the end, our studies revealed that officers’ experience with citizen disrespect, global 
views of citizen animus, perceptions of hostile local media coverage, and the local violent crime 
                                                 
13 As one example, 63% of the sample we surveyed as part of Study 1 supported or strongly supported wearing 
body-worn cameras, compared with 66% who reported being in favor on the National Police Research Platform 
survey (Morin et al. 2017). Similarly, we asked the sample surveyed in Study 2 whether their agency was currently 
using body-worn cameras. Forty-seven percent responded “yes,” compared with 48% who answered yes on the 2016 
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(Hyland, 2018).  
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rate are central predictors of the extent to which they believe the public views them as a 
legitimate authority. These findings are important in their own right, but even more so when we 
consider the possibility of audience legitimacy explaining the relationships between other 
variables and officer behaviors. For example, citizen demeanor and community context (e.g., 
violent crime rate) each predict officer behaviors such as the use of force. Our studies 
demonstrate these same factors are key predictors of audience legitimacy. Thus, audience 
legitimacy may be a key intervening mechanism. We hope future research attempts to explore 
this possibility.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 - Southern Agency  
        
        
  Listwise Deletion Multiple Imputation a    
          
          
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b Min Max 
        
        
Audience Legitimacy 476 3.481 .779 3.483 .782 1 5 
Recently Disrespected 507 3.335 1.395 3.335 1.394 1 5 
Citizen Animus 521 3.418 .659 3.419 .660 1.571 5 
Perceived Crime Trend 514 3.747 .774 3.748 .775 1 5 
Male 446 .901 — .900 — 0 1 
White 446 .673 — .673 — 0 1 
Four-year Degree 449 .546 — .546 — 0 1 
Years of Experience 436 15.110 8.512 15.109 8.545 0 40 
Police Officer (Reference) — — — — — — — 
Front-line Supervisor 447 .367 — .373 — 0 1 
Upper Management 447 .119 — .118 — 0 1 
a 25 imputations, N=546 for each variable; b Obtained via the “misum” command in Stata 15. 
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Table 2. OLS Regression Models Predicting Perceived Audience Legitimacy (Study 1 – Southern Agency, N = 546) 
         
         
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
                 
     
Variable b SE b SE b SE b SE 
         
         
Recently Disrespected -.154*** (.030) —  —  -.053 (.032) 
Citizen Animus —  -.464*** (.051) —  -.394*** (.057) 
Perceived Crime Trend —  —  -.185*** (.046) -.096* (.042) 
Male .154 (.121) .050 (.121) .055 (.123) .075 (.123) 
White .032 (.081) .016 (.076) -.016 (.081) .017 (.075) 
Four-year Degree .052 (.071) .031 (.067) .047 (.071) .028 (.067) 
Experience .002 (.006) .007 (.005) .009 (.005) .005 (.005) 
Police Officer (Reference) —  —  —  —  
Front-line Supervisor .112 (.086) .128 (.082) .225** (.086) .114 (.082) 
Upper Management .215 (.129) .234 (.120) .371** (.129) .177 (.121) 
Intercept 3.715*** (.189) 4.816*** (.226) 3.845*** (.239) 5.133*** (.281) 
         
F-test       8.88***       15.27***       7.32***       12.95*** 
Adjusted R2 .108 .201 .071 .213 
         
         
NOTES: Multiple-imputation estimates (m=25) using OLS regression are displayed. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b) and robust standard errors (SE).  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Weighted Variables (Study 2 - National Sample) 
 
 
  Listwise Deletion Multiple Imputation a   
          
          
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b Min Max 
        
        
Audience Legitimacy 654 3.938 .457 3.935 .458 1.857 5 
Citizen Animus 660 2.746 .641 2.746 .641 1 4.714 
Hostile Local Media 655 2.359 .707 2.362 .710 1 5 
Hostile National Media 655 3.767 .700 3.768 .700 2 5 
Violent Crime Rate c 589 5.057 1.228 5.065 1.223 0 7.939 
% Black c 625 1.327 1.220 1.329 1.213 0 4.557 
% Hispanic c 625 1.837 1.073 1.841 1.068 0 4.550 
Change %Black c 624 2.825 .249 2.825 .248 .483 3.885 
Change %Hispanic c 624 2.525 .345 2.527 .344 1.014 4.417 
Chief 657 .853 — .851 — 0 1 
Years of Experience 632 27.366 9.174 27.388 9.143 3 50 
Master’s Degree 630 .267 — .271 — 0 1 
Large Agency 665 .054 — .054 — 0 1 
White Male 618 .865 — .862 — 0 1 
South (reference) — — —    — — — — 
Northeast 657 .268 — .267 — 0 1 
Midwest 657 .368 — .368 — 0 1 
West 657 .158 — .158 — 0 1 
Population size c 625 8.615 1.407 8.647 1.407 4.836 14.622 
Unemployment Rate c 626 1.995 .529 1.994 .523 0 3.339 
% Trump Voters 631 53.919 16.081 53.690 16.085 8.405 89.335 
        
        
a 25 imputations, N=665 for each variable; b Obtained via the “misum” command in Stata 15; c Natural log transformation. 
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Table 4. OLS Regression Models Predicting Perceived Audience Legitimacy (Study 2 - National Sample, N = 665) 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
                     
                     
Variable b SE b SE       b SE       b SE b SE 
           
           
Citizen Animus -.297*** (.056) —       —       —  -.275*** (.057) 
Hostile Local Media —  -.170*** (.051)      —       —  -.098* (.049) 
Hostile National Media —  .026 (.037)      —       —  .063 (.037) 
Violent Crime Rate a —  —  -.060* (.025)      —  -.058* (.025) 
%Black a —  —       —  -.064* (.029) -.028 (.027) 
%Hispanic a —  —       —  -.002 (.041) .024 (.037) 
Change %Black a —  —       —  .144 (.125) .125 (.106) 
Change %Hispanic a —  —       —  .016 (.104) -.107 (.093) 
Chief .177 (.100) .159 (.100) .185 (.119) .188 (.116) .185* (.089) 
Years of Experience .003 (.004) .005 (.004) .006 (.004) .005 (.004) .003 (.003) 
Master’s Degree .075 (.052) .088 (.055) .054 (.055) .067 (.054) .063 (.050) 
Large Agency .084 (.068) .038 (.072) .026 (.073) .018 (.070) .095 (.066) 
White Male -.046 (.063) -.065 (.066) -.043 (.071) -.036 (.070) -.072 (.062) 
South (Reference) —  —       —       —  —  
Northeast -.114 (.085) -.164 (.099) -.200 (.103) -.257* (.111) -.148 (.093) 
Midwest -.047 (.074) -.069 (.085) -.092 (.086) -.155 (.088) -.072 (.077) 
West -.045 (.082) -.051 (.096) -.048 (.095) -.153 (.109) -.153 (.093) 
Population size a -.050* (.025) -.030 (.027) -.016 (.030) -.013 (.031) -.026 (.027) 
Unemployment Rate a -.147* (.058) -.202** (.067) -.142 (.073) -.156* (.067) -.074 (.062) 
%Trump Voters -.001 (.002) -.004 (.003) -.002 (.003) -.003 (.003) -.002 (.002) 
Intercept 5.355*** (.355) 4.934*** (.405) 4.573*** (.385) 4.055*** (.546) 5.279*** (.497) 
           
F-test       6.19***       4.06***       3.48***      3.18**       5.48*** 
Adjusted R2 .264 .170 .128 .120 .306 
      
      
NOTES: Multiple-imputation estimates (m=25) using OLS regression are displayed. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b) and robust standard errors (SE). 
a Natural log transformation; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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APPENDIX A: FACTOR ANALYES 
Table A1. Pattern Matrices for Factor Analyses with Promax Rotation 
 
Study 1 – Southern Agency Factor 
Item 1 2 
Citizen Animus   
People often disrespect and insult the police. .731  
People are normally polite when dealing with the police.* .495  
People treat police officers with dignity.* .564  
People treat the police worse than they treat other government employees. .666  
People treat police officers unfairly. .762  
People normally listen to the police before jumping to conclusions in incidents.* .457  
People will ignore or walk away from the police when officers try to explain a situation. .560  
Audience Legitimacy   
Most civilians feel an obligation to obey police officers.  .852 
Most civilians believe they should do what the police say, even if they disagree.  .849 
Most civilians feel [this agency] can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the people in their neighborhood.   .727 
Eigenvalue 3.721 1.197 
   
  
Study 2 – National Sample Factor 
Item 1 2 
Citizen Animus   
People often disrespect and insult the police. .667  
People are normally polite when dealing with the police.* .531  
People treat police officers with dignity.* .580  
People treat the police worse than they treat other government employees.  .657  
People treat police officers unfairly. .750  
People normally listen to the police before jumping to conclusions in incidents.* .493  
People will ignore or walk away from the police when officers try to explain a situation.  .568  
Audience Legitimacy [Most residents believe the police…]   
…Are corrupt.*  .453 
…Use rules and procedures that are fair to everyone.  .503 
…Clearly explain the reasons for their actions.  .630 
…Treat people with respect.  .770 
…Are biased against them.*  .567 
…Do a good job tackling crime in the community.  .573 
…Represent their values.   .720 
Eigenvalue 4.068 1.365 
* Item reverse coded. Only factor loadings ≥ .30 are displayed.    
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APPENDIX B: CORRELATION MATRICES 
Table B1. Correlation Matrix for Study 1 Variables 
 
 
Variable Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 
 
 
Y Audience legitimacy 1.00          
X1 Recently Disrespected -.33* 1.00         
X2 Citizen Animus -.42* .46* 1.00        
X3 Perceived Crime Trend -.15* .07 .20* 1.00       
X4 Male -.01 .13* -.01 -.02 1.00      
X5 White .03 .00 .00 -.03 -.01 1.00     
X6 Four-year Degree .01 .02 -.03 -.05 -.16* -.01 1.00    
X7 Years of Experience .19* -.46* -.15* .05 .01 .12* -.18* 1.00   
X8 Front-line Supervisor .11* -.24* -.10* .10* -.01 .14* -.04 .37* 1.00  
X9 Upper Management .16* -.34* -.15* -.08 -.03 .05* .05 .37* -.28* 1.00 
 
 
NOTE: Matrix constructed using listwise deleted data (N = 425). Entries are Pearson’s correlation coefficients.  
* p < .05 
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Table B2. Correlation Matrix for Study 2 Variables 
 
 
Variable Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 X17 X18 X19 
 
 
Y Audience Legitimacy 1.00                    
X1 Citizen Animus -.45* 1.00                   
X2 Hostile Local Media -.25* .38* 1.00                  
X3 Hostile National Media -.03 .17* .25* 1.00                 
X4 Violent Crime Rate a -.17* -.03 .00 .01 1.00                
X5 % Black a -.03 .04 .10 .04 .26* 1.00               
X6 % Hispanic a -.05 -.12 .10 .10 .26* .20* 1.00              
X7 Change %Black a .09 .00 .04 .04 -.01 .37* -.02 1.00             
X8 Change %Hispanic a -.04 -.15 .00 .05 .15* .19* .58* .01 1.00            
X9 Chief .21* -.06 -.17* -.16* -.10 -.24* -.10 -.05 -.09 1.00           
X10 Years of Experience .20* -.24* -.03 .01 .11 .02 .07 .18* .10 .28* 1.00          
X11 Master’s Degree .06 -.08 .13 -.05 .04 .14* .20* .00 .02 .10* .26* 1.00         
X12 Large Agency -.06* -.03 .07* -.02 .17* .22* .18* -.03 .12* -.26* -.01 .12* 1.00        
X13 White Male -.02 -.04 -.10 .06 -.05 -.06 -.12 -.02 -.03 .09 .19* .08 -.08* 1.00       
X14 Northeast -.13 .13 .02 04 -.07 -.14* -.29* -.07 -.11 -.09 .09 .01 -.09* .16* 1.00      
X15 Midwest .04 -.02 .02 -.11 -.03 -.08 -.13 .13 -.02 .10 .03 -.01 -.05* .06 -.42* 1.00     
X16 West .03 -.15* -.04 .05 .04 -.25* .40* -.10 .02 .07 .02 .03 .06 -.16 -.29* -.32* 1.00    
X17 Population size a -.09 -.21* .07 -.03 .33* .37* .40* .04 .33* -.23* .26* .31* .55* -.01 -.09 -.01 .13* 1.00   
X18 Unemployment Rate a -.15 .03 -.03 -.16* .40* .28* .28* .03 .10 -.10 -.02 .08 .07* -.09 -.06 -.11 .12* .16 1.00  
X19 % Trump Voters -.04 .17* -.13* .03 -.09 -.18* -.25* -.14* -.13 .22* -.14 -.25* -.17* .09 -.04 .00 -.26* -.36* -.04 1.00 
                      
                      
NOTE: Matrix constructed using listwise deleted data (N = 541). Entries are Pearson’s correlation coefficients (weighted to account for sampling design using “corr_svy” command in Stata 15).  
a Natural log transformation. 
* p < .05 
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APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES  
Table C1. Study 1: Comparison of Observed Results to Simulated Results wherein Nonrespondents Were Assumed to Have 
Differed Substantially from Respondents on Perceived Audience Legitimacy 
       
       
    Simulated Data 
     
     
 Observed Data a Negative Bias Threshold b Positive Bias Threshold c 
             
    
Variable b SE b SE b SE 
       
       
Recently Disrespected -.053 (.032) -.017 (.024) -.048* (.024) 
Citizen Animus -.394*** (.057) -.264*** (.044) -.261*** (.044) 
Perceived Crime Trend -.096* (.042) -.069* (.033) -.047 (.033) 
Male .075 (.123) .057 (.098) .057 (.095) 
White .017 (.075) .016 (.061) .016 (.060) 
Four-year Degree .028 (.067) .021 (.059) .020 (.058) 
Experience .005 (.005) .004 (.004) .004 (.005) 
Police Officer (Reference) —  —  —  
Front-line Supervisor .114 (.082) .096 (.074) .093 (.073) 
Upper Management .177 (.121) .160 (.113) .156 (.109) 
Intercept 5.133*** (.281) 3.757*** (.217) 5.255 (.205) 
       
N 546 1,752 1,752 
F-test       12.95*** 7.40*** 6.77*** 
       
       
a Multiple-imputation estimates (m=25) using OLS regression are displayed. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b) and robust standard errors (SE). 
b Mean coefficients and standard errors across 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations where we assumed nonrespondents would have scored 1-2 SDs below the respondent group mean 
on our dependent variable. Recently disrespected was statistically significant 0 times, citizen animus 1,000 times, and perceived crime trend 712 times.  
c Mean coefficients and standard errors across 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations where we assumed nonrespondents would have scored 1-2 SDs above the respondent group mean 
on our dependent variable. Recently disrespected was statistically significant 538 times, citizen animus 1,000 times, and perceived crime trend 21 times. 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table C2. Study 2: Comparison of Observed Results to Simulated Results wherein Nonrespondents Were Assumed to Have 
Differed Substantially from Respondents on Perceived Audience Legitimacy  
       
       
    Simulated Data 
     
     
 Observed Data a Negative Bias Threshold b Positive Bias Threshold c 
             
Variable b SE b SE b SE 
       
       
Citizen Animus -.275*** (.057) -.182*** (.031) -.177*** (.030) 
Hostile Local Media -.098* (.049) -.083** (.026) -.077*** (.023) 
Hostile National Media .063 (.037) .037 (.024) .032 (.024) 
Violent Crime Rated -.058* (.025) -.044* (.018) -.040* (.018) 
%Blackd -.028 (.027) -.024 (.020) -.018 (.019) 
%Hispanicd .024 (.037) .018 (.023) .015 (.024) 
Change %Blackd .125 (.106) .036 (.069) .051 (.066) 
Change %Hispanicd -.107 (.093) -.048 (.062) -.059 (.069) 
Chief .185* (.089) .065 (.042) .072 (.043) 
Years of Experience .003 (.003) .002 (.002) .001 (.002) 
Master’s Degree .063 (.050) .017 (.034) .034 (.032) 
Large Agency .095 (.066) .204*** (.035) -.092** (.037) 
White Male -.072 (.062) -.025 (.043) -.016 (.041) 
South (Reference) —  —  —  
Northeast -.148 (.093) -.069 (.051) -.094 (.053) 
Midwest -.072 (.077) -.035 (.045) -.060 (.044) 
West -.153 (.093) -.032 (.061) -.061 (.059) 
Population Sized -.026 (.027) -.068*** (.017) .042** (.016) 
Unemployment Rated -.074 (.062) -.070 (.043) -.050 (.044) 
%Trump Voters -.002 (.002) .000 (.001) -.001 (.001) 
Intercept 5.279*** (.497) 5.056*** (.326) 4.796*** (.323) 
       
N 665 2,496 2,496 
F-test       5.48*** 6.76*** 4.32*** 
a Multiple-imputation estimates (m=25) using OLS regression are displayed. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b) and robust standard errors (SE). 
b Mean coefficients and standard errors across 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations where we assumed nonrespondents would have scored 1-2 SDs below the respondent group mean 
on our dependent variable. Citizen animus was statistically significant 1,000 times, local media 1,000 times, national media 12 times, and violent crime rate 995 times. %Black, 
%Hispanic, Change %Black, and Change %Hispanic were not statistically significant in any of the simulated models.  
c Mean coefficients and standard errors across 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations where we assumed nonrespondents would have scored 1-2 SDs above the respondent group mean 
on our dependent variable. Citizen animus was statistically significant 1,000 times, local media 1,000 times, national media 1 time, and violent crime rate 914 times. %Black, 
%Hispanic, Change %Black, and Change %Hispanic were not statistically significant in any of the simulated models. 
d Natural log transformation.  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table C3. Study 2: Regression Models Predicting Procedural Justice, Distributive Justice, Lawfulness, and Effectiveness  
(N = 665) 
         
         
 Procedural Justice Distributive Justice Lawfulness Effectiveness b 
                 
     
Variable b SE b SE b SE b SE 
         
         
Citizen Animus -.268*** .065 -.341*** .071 -.270*** .073 -.924* .387 
Hostile Local Media -.091 .057 -.127* .058 -.097 .059 -.329 .317 
Hostile National Media .025 .047 .162** .049 .039 .054 -.189 .222 
Violent Crime Rate a -.055 .038 -.035 .037 -.082* .037 -.254 .169 
%Black a -.020 .034 -.004 .035 -.076 .040 -.395* .191 
%Hispanic a .055 .045 .049 .057 -.003 .041 -.123 .230 
Change %Black a .192 .123 .063 .135 .101 .125 .488 .582 
Change %Hispanic a -.220* .100 -.084 .142 -.122 .123 -.012 .623 
Chief .202 .107 .176 .111 .172 .132 .581 .623 
Years of Experience .000 .004 .006 .004 .005 .005 .014 .022 
Master’s Degree .009 .061 .097 .062 .094 .070 -.022 .318 
Large Agency .193* .081 .049 .096 .075 .087 .230 .424 
White Male .036 .093 -.089 .085 -.140 .087 -1.027** .343 
South (Reference) —  —  —  —  
Northeast -.155 .115 -.132 .125 -.204 .123 -1.256* .508 
Midwest -.034 .089 -.073 .109 -.154 .107 -.976* .470 
West -.164 .104 -.060 .116 -.276 .145 -1.304* .588 
Population size a -.071* .030 -.037 .038 .004 .035 -.086 .195 
Unemployment Rate a -.019 .076 -.156 .087 -.007 .084 -.170 .348 
%Trump Voters -.001 .002 -.002 .003 -.004 .003 -.011 .012 
Intercept 5.541*** .606 5.050*** .641 5.651*** .666 —  
         
F-test 4.15*** 7.48*** 4.09*** 2.98*** 
Adjusted R2 .214 .266 .233 — 
         
         
NOTES: Multiple-imputation estimates (m=25) using OLS regression are displayed unless otherwise noted. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b) and robust 
standard errors (SE).  
a Natural log transformation; b Ordered logistic regression; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
